For most of these, there is a strong bias towards close votes (I will have more to say about these histograms below). Another example is the rating constructed by Peltzman (1985) , which excludes all roll calls for which the margin of victory was greater than 2 to 1. Ratings are summary statistics that depend both on legislators' true preferences and on the location of the cleavage points (or, more generally, the locations of the aye and nay alternatives) associated with the roll calls used in constructing the ratings. Other factors may also affect the relationship between ratings and preferences, such as logrolling, vote trading, and leadership pressures. Lacking sufficient information about the distribution of cleavage points and about the importance of other potential complications, one can not be confident that ratings provide accurate estimates of legislators' preferences.
The fact that ratings are based on samples of roll calls makes them a special case of a general problem in the estimation of legislator preferences. To estimate legislators' preferences from roll-call data, one must make assumptions not only about how legislators make their voting decisions but also about how legislation reaches the roll-call stage. Just as it is unlikely that legislators' ideal points are randomly distributed throughout some feasible space, it is unlikely that roll calls on the House or Senate floor are randomly drawn from some set of all possible bills. For example, if most roll calls on important issues are the results of unanticipated shocks to policies or preferences (as in Snyder 199 la) and if most of these shocks are small relative to the range of ideal points among legislators, then the cleavage points on most important roll calls will be close to the median of the legislators' ideal points and few roll calls will have cleavage points near the tails of this distribution. Figure 5 shows that, across all roll calls, there are more close votes than lopsided votes, although the difference is less pronounced than in the small samples chosen by interest groups. The conceptual and methodological issues related to the endogenous roll-call agenda have recently received more attention (e.g., Schneider 1979; Koford 1990; VanDoren 1990; Snyder 1992a, 1992b) and will undoubtedly receive still more in the future.
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A Simple Example
The intuition underlying the main argument in this paper is best illustrated by a simple example. Suppose there are 11 legislators, each with symmetric, single-peaked preferences over a one-dimensional policy space. Their ideal points are distributed uniformly over the interval [0,1 ], so one legislator's ideal point is at 0, one is at . , one is at .2, and so on (see Figure 6 , top).
Suppose an interest group uses 12 roll calls to calculate its ratings. If we assume that legislators always vote sincerely (i.e, that when faced with two options they always vote for the one they prefer), each roll call can be represented by a cleavage point on the line, with legislators whose ideal points lie to one side of the cleavage point voting aye on the roll call and those on the opposite side voting nay.4 Suppose the interest group's ideal point is far to the right, so that the group always labels those legislators whose ideal points lie to the right of the cleavage point as casting correct votes and those with ideal points to the left of the cleavage point as casting incorrect votes. Figure 6 , center). Thus the distribution of cleavage points is symmetric and unimodal, with its peak at around .5.
The result is a bimodal distribution of ratings, even though the distribution of ideal points is uniform (see Figure 6 , bottom). All of the moderately left and moderately right legislators receive ratings that are more extreme than their ideal points. That is, legislators with ideal points in the interval (0,.5) are assigned ratings closer to 0 than their ideal points, and those with ideal points in the interval (.5,1) are assigned ratings closer to 1 than their ideal points. For example, a legislator whose true ideal point is at .4 votes correctly on 3 of the 12 roll calls and therefore receives a rating of .25. Moreover, there are mass points of legislators with ratings of 0 and 1. Thus, the ratings make the legislature appear to be more polarized than it actually is.
If the distribution of cleavage points is more uniform, the distribution of ratings will be less bimodal but will still exaggerate the extremism in the legislature, unless the distribution of cleavage points is exactly uniform. On the other hand, if the distribution of cleavage points is bimodal, then the ratings will tend to understate the degree of extremism in the legislature. In short, to tell whether the distribution of scores produced by a rating accurately reflects the underlying distribution of ideal points, one must know more about the distribution of cleavage points in the set of bills used in constructing the rating.5 A More General Result I now present a somewhat more general result, for normal distributions of ideal points and cleavage points. The result is simply stated: if the distributions of ideal points and cleavage points are both normal, the distribution of legislators' interest group scores will be bimodal if and only if the variance of the distribution of roll-call cleavage points is smaller than the variance of the distribution of legislator ideal points.
As above, assume the policy space is one dimensional. Let F:R-[0,1] be a cumulative distribution function that describes the distribution of legislator ideal points, and let f = F' be the probability density function corresponding to F Similarly, let G:R--[0,1] be a cumulative distribution function describing the distribution of cleavage points, and let g = G' be the probability density function corresponding to G. Also, as above, assume that legislators always vote sincerely, that on each roll call the interest group assigns a 1 to all legislators who vote for the alternative to the right of the cleavage point, and that each legislator's rating is equal to his or her average score. Then, since a legislator with ideal point at x receives a score of 1 whenever the cleavage point is less than x and a score of 0 otherwise, the rating of such a legislator is simply equal to the fraction of roll calls with cleavage points less than x, or G(x). The following proposition is then easily proved.
Proposition 1: Suppose the distribution of legislator ideal points is N(0,1) and the distribution of cleavage points is N(0,&2). When a2 > 1, the distribution of ratings is not bimodal, but it still exaggerates the degree of extremism in the legislature. For example, if a2 = 1, then the distribution of ratings is uniform over the interval [0,1]. However, the distribution of ideal points is normal and therefore strongly unimodal (and symmetric), with its mode in the center. Thus, the distribution of the ratings does not describe the distribution of ideal points very well-instead, it greatly understates the number of moderate legislators.
Clearly, if the distribution of ideal points is normal, then an interest group's ratings accurately describe the distribution of ideal points only if the distribution of ratings is itself approximately normal. The example in the previous section suggests that, for the distribution of ratings to be normal, the cleavage points in the sample of roll calls used in constructing the rating should be approximately uniform over the range of legislators' ideal points. Figure 7 shows that this is in fact the case. In the top half of the figure, the distribution of cleavage points is N(0,2), and therefore somewhat more diffuse than the distribution of ideal points. The left-hand side shows the distribution of cleavage points relative to the distribution of ideal points, and the right-hand side shows the resulting distribution of ratings compared to a normal distribution with the same mean and standard deviation (the mean is .5 and the standard deviation is approximately . 179). The distribution of ratings is roughly normal, although the fit is not great. In the bottom half of Figure 7 , the distribution of cleavage points is N(0,5). There, the distribution of cleavage points fits the distribution of ideal points quite well, and the distribution of ratings looks quite normal (with mean .5 and standard deviation approximately .079). Figure 7 suggests that, given a distribution of legislator ideal points, the variance of the distribution of legislator ratings is inversely related to the variance of the distribution of cleavage point. In fact, it is easy to show that this is true. This result forms the basis for an empirical test in the next section, and may prove to be generally useful in empirical work.6 Proposition 2. Suppose the distribution of legislator ideal points is N(0, 1). Let g, and g2 be probability density functions describing two distributions of cleavage points, and assume that these distri Proposition 2 states that the variance in legislators' scores for a given group's rating is negatively related to the variance of the distribution of cleavage points in the sample of roll calls used to construct the rating. Of course, cleavage points are not observable in practice, but must be estimated.7 Vote margins are observable, however, and in the unidimensional model above there is a close relationship between the cleavage point on a roll call and the vote margin on that roll call. This relationship is straightforward: if close to 50% of the legislators vote aye on a roll call, then the cleavage point on that roll call must be near the center of the distribution of ideal points, while if 10% or 90% of the legislators vote aye, then the cleavage point must be near one of the ends of the distribution. By an argument similar to the proof of proposition 2, it is easy to show that the variance of the distribution of vote margins is an increasing function of the variance of the distribution of cleavage points. The intuition is simple: if the cleavage points are clustered, then all vote margins will be about the same, while if the cleavage points are spread out, then the vote margins will be spread out as well. Thus proposition 2 can be translated into a proposition about the relationship between the variance in scores and the distribution of vote margins in the sample of roll calls: namely, that the variance in legislators' scores for a given group's rating is inversely related to the variance of the distribution of vote margins in the sample of roll calls used to construct the rating. This is the proposition I will investigate.
The eight group ratings in Figures 1-4 show a pattern quite consistent with the prediction. For six of the eight ratings, the distribution of vote margins is densest near the center, with many more close roll calls than lopsided ones, while the distribution of legislators' scores is bimodal, with many more extremists than moderates. The ACA rating in 1979 is a good example (Figure 2 ). An interesting exception, also consistent with the proposition, is the CCUS rating in 1980 (Figure 4) . For that rating, the distribution of vote margins is more widely dispersed, and the distribution of scores is strongly unimodal. 
Applications
In this section, I discuss several applications of the results above. The first application concerns public choice studies that attempt to untangle the effects on congressional roll-call voting of constituency interests, ideology, shirking, interest group lobbying and campaign contributions, and logrolling. Stated simply, the implication of the discussion so far is this: since most interest group ratings make Interest Group Ratings fairly moderate members of Congress appear more extreme than they are, studies which use such ratings as measures of ideology tend to underestimate the effect of ideology on voting. This conclusion is somewhat surprising, since the studies in question virtually always find the ratings to be highly significant explanatory variables. It suggests that ideology may be an even more important determinant of roll-call voting than previous estimates have shown.9
To understand the result, suppose that a legislator's ideology is his or her true ideal point on the left-right continuum. Also, suppose the true relationship between ideology and the propensity to vote for a particular bill is of the form Pi = ao + p0xi + Si, where Pi is legislator i's propensity to vote for the bill and xi is legislator i's ideal point. Finally, suppose an observer sees xi rather than xi, where ki is legislator i's ADA score (or some other rating). If xi is plagued with the artificial extremism studied above, then xi < xi for relatively small values ofxi and xi > xi for relatively large values of xi (i.e., moderate liberals are misclassified as rather extreme liberals, and moderate conservatives are misclassified as rather extreme conservatives). It is then easy to see that estimating the equation Pi = a + p3xi + Ai produces an estimate P that is biased towards zero relative to P0. This is shown graphically in Figure 9 , where the true points are marked with circles and the observed points (i.e., the data) are marked with squares.10 The intuition is straightforward: if moderately liberal legislators receive extremely liberal ratings, then an observer who knows the ratings (but not the true positions) will expect those legislators to have a strong propensity to vote for the liberal alternative on any roll call. Since the legislators' actual votes will reflect their true, moderate positions, they will not vote for the liberal alternative as overwhelmingly as expected. Thus, the observer will wrongly conclude that ideology does not have a very strong effect on the legislator's propensity to vote for the liberal alternative. The same argument holds for moderately conservative legislators. The extent of the bias clearly depends on the extent to which the scores are artificially extreme (and also on the distribution of true ideal points).
A closely related application concerns the studies of constituency/representative linkages that use interest group ratings to measure legislators' roll-call records (e.g., 
Interest Group Ratings 1990
). 1 These studies compare the mean score of committee members on some group's rating with the mean score of noncommittee members, using t-statistics to test the null hypothesis that the committee and noncommittee means are the same. Also, since it is arguable on theoretical grounds that a more relevant difference is that between the median ideal point of the committee and the median ideal point in the whole house, Krehbiel (1990) and Hall and Grofman (1990) report the difference between the median score in the committee and the median score in the house, as well as the percentage of legislators whose scores lie between the two medians.
Artificial extremism in the distribution of scores has three consequences for these studies that deserve attention. The first consequence is that, if the distribution of scores has artificially large tails, then the standard deviation of the distribution will be artificially large. The t-statistics of the difference between committee and noncommittee mean scores will then tend to be artificially small, and consequently there will be a bias towards accepting the null hypothesis that the two means are equal. That is, there will be a bias towards incorrectly concluding that committees are not significant preference outliers.
It is difficult to know by how much the standard deviations of various scores overstate the standard deviations in ideal points, because the latter are unmeasured. It is possible to gain some insight, however, by considering a uniform distribution as a base case. Suppose 435 representatives have ideal points distributed uniformly over some interval, and the mean ideal point is at x. Assuming that all ideal points lie between 0 and 100 (as they do in most ratings), ifx < 50 then the largest possible interval over which the ideal points can be spread is [0,2x].'2 Similarly, ifx > 50, then the largest possible interval is [2x -100,100]. In either case, the standard deviation of the representatives' ideal points is approximately .58x (and the mean is x).13 By comparison, of the 47 ratings in the sample used in Figure 8 , 37 (almost 80%) have standard deviations greater than .58 times their mean. Thus, for the vast majority of these ratings, the distributions of scores has a larger standard deviation than the widest possible uniform distribution with the same mean.
The second consequence of artificially bimodal distributions is that the percentage of representatives whose scores lie in the gap between the median score among committee members and the median score in the whole House is not a very meaningful statistic. Since bimodal distributions have relatively few scores near the center of the distribution, the percentage of scores between the medians will tend to be small even if the medians are far apart. In fact, Krehbiel (1990) While the first two problems imply that artificial extremism in interest group ratings may lead researchers to underestimate the differences between committee preferences and floor preferences, the third problem is that in some cases exactly the opposite is true. That is, for some distributions of ideal points, artificial extremism in the distribution of scores actually exaggerates the difference between a committee and the floor, leading one to conclude that a committee is more of an outlier than it really is. For example, a committee may contain a disproportionate number of moderate conservatives (or moderate high-demanders) while the House as a whole contains a disproportionate number of moderate liberals (or moderate low-demanders), or the reverse may be true. Then, since a bias in ratings gives moderate legislators scores that are more extreme than their true positions, a significant number of the committee members will receive ratings to the right of their true positions, and a significant number of noncommittee members will receive ratings to the left of their true positions. The net effect, clearly, is to exaggerate the difference in preferences between committee members and non-members.
A simple example shows how severe the problem can be. Suppose a committee has 40 members, with ideal points as follows: two each at 0,. 1, .2,.3, .8 and .9; four at .4; six at .5; ten at .6; and eight at .7 (see Figure 10, respectively, and the mean and variance of the non-committee ratings are .425 and .350, and the t-statistic for a test of the difference in means is 2.58, which is significant at the 1% level. Again, because the distribution of actual ideal points is unknown, it is difficult to guess how severe a problem this bias is likely to be in practice. On the one hand, the distributions of ideal points in the example above are not particularly odd or contrived. On the other hand, according to the high-demand-outlier hypothesis (see Weingast and Marshall 1988) , outlier committees should be laden with extremely high-demand members, not with the moderately highdemand members in the example.
Overall, I suspect that the first two problems raised above are more important than the third, and therefore on balance the bias produced by artificial extremism in ratings is in the direction of finding no difference between committee and floor preferences. In any event, the problems raise doubts about the conclusions one can draw from empirical studies that focus exclusively on the means, medians, and These examples raise doubts about the correct interpretation of Rohde's evidence on changes in House roll-call voting (although they do not question the overall importance of Rohde's analysis, which is insightful and rich in detail). As was noted above, there was a significant increase in Democratic mean cohesion over the period 1971-88. For Republicans outside the Northeast, mean cohesion increased over the period, suggesting that some change in preferences probably occurred. Among northeastern Republicans, however, mean cohesion exhibited little trend over the period; if anything, it decreased slightly. Careful consideration of the changes, if any, in the distributions of vote margins on the roll calls taken during 1971-89 (as proxies for the distributions of cleavage points) would surely add to our understanding of the changes that took place.
Concluding Remarks
Proposition 1 above gives plausible conditions under which interest group ratings based on roll-call data will exaggerate the degree of extremism in the distribution of legislators' ideal points. As was noted in the introduction, it is likely that most if not all ratings suffer from this problem, since the samples of roll calls used to construct these ratings tend not to include many roll calls with lopsided votes but are instead weighted heavily in favor of roll calls with close votes. The actual distribution of legislator ideal points may or may not be bimodal but, whatever the case, one cannot discover the truth simply by looking at interest group ratings.
What does this mean for the analysis of roll-call data? A few suggestions come to mind. First, the examples illustrated in Figures 6 and 7 suggest a way to reduce the bias in interest group ratings, without throwing away all of the information provided by the rating (in particular, without throwing away the groups' judgments about what are important roll calls and what are correct votes on those roll calls). Recall that in order for a rating to accurately reflect the underlying distribution of ideal points, the sample of roll calls used in constructing the rating must contain roughly equal numbers of very close, fairly close, and lopsided votes. Thus, one way to correct for the bias in a group's rating is to recalculate legislators' scores after weighting the roll calls included in the rating to approximate a uniform distribution. Generally, lopsided roll calls will have to be weighted more heavily than close roll calls. In principle, the weighting should produce ideal point estimates that are less biased than the ratings themselves, although it remains to be seen how well this technique works in practice.
Another possibility, which is even simpler, is to convert interest group ratings into discrete variables, as in Johannes and McAdams (1981) . If the information contained in most ratings is best viewed as ordinal-level data rather than interval-level data, then assigning low, middle, and high values to legislators may result in variables that are less biased. The choice of dividing points will always be somewhat arbitrary, of course, but it is possible to check for robustness. At a minimum, researchers using interest group ratings must analyze the distribution of scores and the distribution of vote margins in more detail.
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On the basis of the results above, I suspect that the mean and variance of a group's scores are rarely the only relevant summary statistics.
Better yet, researchers could rely less on interest group ratings than they have in the past and turn instead to estimates produced by scaling techniques, such as the techniques of Poole and Rosenthal (1985, 1991) and Brady (1989) . These techniques can (indeed, should) be applied to large sets of roll calls, and they allow the researcher to choose which roll calls to include in his or her analysis, rather than relying on the choices of some interest group. Software to implement these scaling techniques is becoming more widely available (a one-dimensional version of Poole and Rosenthal's NOMINATE scaling algorithm is now publicly available), and as they come into widespread use the strengths and weaknesses of various scalings will become more apparent.
Finally, Hall and Grofman (1990) are surely correct in advising researchers to use constituency characteristics as well as roll-call voting behavior to measure representatives' preferences. I would add that carefully constructed data derived from interviews or drawn from other decisions made by legislators, such as bill sponsorship and committee votes, are also essential. Only when a variety of data lead to similar conclusions can these conclusions be stated with confidence.
